



INTEGRITY COMMISSION

Investigation Division

SPECIAL REPORT TO PARLIAMENT

Public Procurement in Jamaica: Key Trends and Issues

Contract Awards in 2025, with Trends from 2006 to 2025

**Submitted to the Houses of Parliament pursuant to
Section 36(3) of the Integrity Commission Act, 2017**

Arising from the examination by the Director of
Investigation of the contract award data submitted by
procuring entities

MONITOR • ASSESS • ASSURE

OCTOBER 2026




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REPORT AT A GLANCE

Findings of the Director of Investigation (DI) on contracts awarded by procuring entities in 2025, with trends from 2006 to 2025.

Single source procurement is the prevailing practice, not an exception

In 2025, 69.2 percent of contracts were awarded without competition and only 4.1 percent by open competitive bidding, although the Public Procurement Act makes open competition the general rule. The share has been around two-thirds every year since 2017, an outcome inconsistent with the objects of the Act.

The year 2025

33,583 contracts awarded <i>J\$336.4 billion</i>	69.2% of contracts (by number) by single source <i>27.3% of value</i>	4.1% of contracts (by number) by open competitive bidding <i>19.0% of value</i>	J\$16.3bn emergency contracts (value) <i>63% more than in 2024</i>
40.5% of single-source value in awards above the Tier 1 limit <i>fewer than 1% of such awards by number</i>	14.4% of Tier 3 value awarded by single source <i>6.1% in 2024</i>	82.4% of contracts (by number) within the threshold where registration is not required <i>10.4% of value; open to MSMEs</i>	25.0% of contracts (by number) above that threshold with a PPC registration number <i>where 89.6% of value is awarded</i>

Principal conclusions

- **Competition is the exception.** About two-thirds of contracts by number have been awarded without competition in every year since 2017; 69.2% in 2025.
- **Some awards warrant examination.** 3,052 single-source awards (J\$51.6bn) were above the single source threshold, and on 416 occasions same-day awards together exceeded it.
- **The 2025 changes widened non-competitive and internally approved awards.** Single source of works of J\$2m to J\$5m rose from 36% to 83% within 2025.
- **Value is concentrated in high-value single-source awards.** Awards above the Tier 1 limit, under 1% by number, carried 40.5% of single-source value.
- **Emergency procurement requires accountability after the event.** J\$16.3bn in 2025, 63% more than in 2024; J\$10.5bn in the fourth quarter, the highest quarter recorded.
- **Registration: proportionate at low value, unconfirmed where value is concentrated.** 82.4% of contracts (by number) fall within the exemption from registration; above the threshold, 25.0% record a PPC number.

Matters for the attention of Parliament

Matter	Recommended action for the consideration of Parliament	Para.
Competition as the general rule	Review the competition thresholds and their use, to restore competition as the general rule.	7.2
The 2025 competition thresholds	Evaluate the effect of the 2025 Competition Threshold Order after a full year.	7.3
Approval of higher-value contracts	Consider whether controls on contracts no longer externally approved suffice; review the tier limits.	7.4
High-value single source procurement	Require the section 25 justification to be recorded for single-source awards above the threshold.	7.5
Emergency procurement	Require by law a post-emergency review, reported to Parliament, after every declared disaster.	7.6
Registration and MSMEs	Make registration simpler and more accessible to MSMEs, preserving its assurance.	7.7
Division of requirements	Consider whether section 25G is sufficient and the aggregation rules should be clarified.	7.8

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Special Report sets out the findings of the Director of Investigation (DI) on the contracts awarded by procuring entities in 2025, the reporting period, and on the trends in contract awards from 2006 to 2025. It is based on the Quarterly Contract Award Reports (QCARs) submitted to the Integrity Commission, and assesses the findings against the objects of the Public Procurement Act, which makes open competition the general rule. In 2025, procuring entities reported 33,583 contracts valued at J\$336.4 billion. Contracts are approved at one of three tiers according to their value: within the procuring entity (Tier 1, up to J\$60 million), with the endorsement of the Public Procurement Commission (PPC) (Tier 2, up to J\$100 million), and also with the approval of Cabinet (Tier 3, above J\$100 million).

Principal Findings

- (a) **Competition is the exception.** In 2025, single source procurement, including emergency contracting, accounted for 69.2 percent of contracts by number and 27.3 percent by value, and open competitive bidding for 4.1 percent of contracts by number. Single source procurement has accounted for about two-thirds of contracts in every year since 2017 (paragraphs 3.6 and 4.5).
- (b) **Not explained by the nature of the requirements.** Fewer than 8 percent of single-source awards were for requirements, such as legal services and software licences, for which there is often only one supplier. Most were routine purchases of lower value (paragraph 3.17).
- (c) **Awards which warrant examination.** In 2025, 3,052 single-source awards, valued at J\$51.6 billion, were above the single source threshold, where the Public Procurement Act permits the method only in limited circumstances. On 416 occasions, single-source awards made to the same contractor on the same day together exceeded the single source limit (paragraphs 3.18 and 3.31).
- (d) **Effect of the 2025 changes.** After the single source thresholds were raised, single source procurement rose from 36 to 83 percent of works contracts of J\$2 million to J\$5 million. After the tier limits were raised, 197 contracts, valued at J\$8.4 billion, were approved without the PPC endorsement previously required (paragraphs 4.10 and 3.25).
- (e) **High-value single source procurement.** Single-source awards above the Tier 1 limit, fewer than 1 percent of single-source awards by number, accounted for 40.5 percent of single-source value. The share of Tier 3 value awarded by single source rose from 6.1 to 14.4 percent (paragraphs 3.24 and 3.23).

- (f) **Emergency contracting.** Emergency contracts amounted to J\$16.3 billion in 2025, 63 percent more than in 2024, including J\$10.5 billion in the fourth quarter, the highest quarter recorded. A further 360 single-source awards described as hurricane related were not recorded as emergency contracting (paragraphs 3.10 and 3.13).
- (g) **Concentration and participation.** The largest 1 percent of contractors received 70.4 percent of the value awarded, and only one bid was received in 31.6 percent of restricted bidding awards (paragraphs 3.28 and 3.26).
- (h) **Registration.** 82.4 percent of contracts by number fall within the exemption from registration, enabling the participation of micro, small and medium enterprises. Above the threshold, where 89.6 percent of value lies, a PPC registration number is recorded for only 25.0 percent of contracts, so that compliance cannot be confirmed from the returns (paragraphs 3.34 and 3.39).

Matters for the Attention of Parliament

Arising from these findings, the DI respectfully submits for the consideration of Parliament the matters set out in Section 7. In each case the DI sets the policy position under the Public Procurement Act alongside the outcome shown by the data, identifies the respect in which that outcome is inconsistent with the objects of the Act, and recommends a course of action for the consideration of Parliament. The conclusions of the DI are set out in Section 5 and the recommendations in Section 6.

1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 Section 36(3) of the Integrity Commission Act, 2017 (the "Act") provides that "the Commission may, at any time, submit a report relating to any particular matter which, in the opinion of the Commission, requires the special attention of the Parliament."
- 1.2 In exercise of that power, the Integrity Commission (the "Commission") has the honour to submit to both Houses of Parliament this Special Report, which sets out the findings of the Director of Investigation (the "DI") arising from his examination of the contract award data submitted to the Commission by procuring entities for the period 2006 to 2025. It is submitted for the information of Honourable Members and for such action as Parliament may consider appropriate.
- 1.3 Procuring entities are required to report to the Commission, on a quarterly basis, all contracts awarded with a value exceeding J\$500,000 (the Quarterly Contract Award Report, or "QCAR"). Having reviewed the contract award data submitted to the Commission from 2006 to 2025, the DI considered that a comprehensive examination was warranted. The examination covers the calendar year 2025, which is the reporting period of this Report (the "reporting period"), and the trends from 2006 to 2025. Reference is made to individual quarters, and to 2024, where this assists in understanding particular events, including the emergency contracting which followed Hurricane Melissa in the fourth quarter of 2025, or provides context.
- 1.4 The Commission's special monitoring programme for procurement related to the Hurricane Melissa response and recovery is ongoing, and its findings will be reported to Parliament separately.
- 1.5 The DI has assessed his findings against the objects of the Public Procurement Act, 2015, which include the maximisation of economy and efficiency, the attainment of value for money, the promotion of competition among suppliers, the fostering of transparency, the promotion of integrity and public confidence, and the encouragement of participation in public procurement. Section 2 of this Report explains the procurement methods, the thresholds which govern their use and the approval tiers, so that the findings may be read in their legal context.
- 1.6 Each contract is assigned to one of three approval tiers according to its value, and the tier determines who must approve the award. Contracts in Tier 1, of up to J\$60 million, are approved within the procuring entity; contracts in Tier 2, above J\$60 million and up to J\$100 million, also require the endorsement of the PPC; and contracts in Tier 3, above J\$100 million, also require the approval of Cabinet. Before July 7, 2025, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 limits were J\$30 million and J\$60 million respectively.

- 1.7** Much of the single source procurement described in this Report falls within the values permitted by the competition thresholds. The DI's concern is that the outcome is inconsistent with the objects of the Public Procurement Act, which makes open competition the general rule. In addition, the Report identifies patterns which may indicate non-compliance and which warrant examination, including the award of single-source contracts above the single source threshold, where the Act permits it only in limited circumstances, and repeated awards to the same contractors on the same day whose combined value exceeded the single source limit.
- 1.8** The DI is of the opinion that the matters set out in this Report require the special attention of Parliament because:
- (a) they are systemic rather than transient, having persisted over many years and across a wide range of procuring entities, and cannot be corrected by individual entities acting alone;
 - (b) the limited use of competition, the limited participation of bidders and the repeated award of contracts to the same suppliers without competition, which may facilitate the avoidance of competition, diminish the assurance that public funds are spent fairly, transparently and with value for money, contrary to the objects of the Public Procurement Act;
 - (c) the changes made in 2025 to the thresholds for the procurement methods, to the approval tiers and to the rules for emergency procurement have materially altered the conditions under which contracts are awarded, and their effects warrant review; and
 - (d) several of the measures recommended in this Report fall within the purview of policy and legislation, and therefore of Parliament and the Executive.

2. THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

Objects of Public Procurement

- 2.1** Section 5 of the Public Procurement Act sets out its objects, which are to:
- (a) maximise economy and efficiency in public procurement;
 - (b) promote economic development through public procurement;
 - (c) obtain value for money in public procurement;
 - (d) promote integrity and engender public confidence in the public procurement process;
 - (e) foster transparency in the public procurement process;
 - (f) encourage participation in public procurement;

- (g) promote competition among suppliers;
- (h) provide for the fair and equitable treatment of all persons participating in public procurement; and
- (i) encourage national growth by enabling the participation of small and medium sized enterprises.

2.2 These objects provide the standard against which the findings of this Report should be read. Competition is the principal means by which value for money, transparency, fairness and participation are secured, and the extent to which it is used is therefore a central measure of the performance of the procurement system.

Procurement Methods

2.3 As amended in 2025, the Public Procurement Act provides that, except as otherwise provided in sections 24 and 25, a procuring entity shall conduct procurement by means of open competition, that is, by national or international competitive bidding or by request for proposals. Open competition is therefore the general rule, at every value.

2.4 A procuring entity may restrict competition, by restricted bidding among a minimum of three selected suppliers or by request for quotations, where the value of the procurement does not exceed the competition threshold for restricted competition, or where the circumstances set out in section 24 apply, such as requirements of a highly complex or specialised nature available from a limited number of suppliers, or an urgent need in the public interest.

2.5 A procuring entity may use single source procurement where the value does not exceed the single source threshold, or where the circumstances set out in section 25 apply, namely where the requirement is available from one supplier only or a supplier has exclusive rights, where additional supplies are needed for standardisation or compatibility, for the protection of national security or defence, or in situations of emergency or extreme urgency. Section 25G, inserted in 2018, prohibits the head of a procuring entity from authorising a less competitive method by dividing a single procurement into separate procurements so as to reduce its estimated value artificially.

Competition Thresholds

2.6 Table 1 sets out the thresholds which determine the least competitive method that may be used for a contract of a given value. Each entry shows the range of values within which that method is the least competitive method permitted; it does not require the method to be used. The Public Procurement (Competition Threshold) Order, 2025, which took effect on May 16, 2025, raised the single source threshold

from J\$1.5 million to J\$3 million for goods and services and from J\$2 million to J\$5 million for works.

Table 1. Competition thresholds: value range within which each method is the least competitive method permitted

Method	Goods	Services	Works
Single source	Up to J\$3m (J\$1.5m before May 16, 2025)	Up to J\$3m (J\$1.5m before May 16, 2025)	Up to J\$5m (J\$2m before May 16, 2025)
Restricted bidding, at least 3 suppliers	Above single source threshold, up to J\$5m	Above single source threshold, up to J\$3m	Above single source threshold, up to J\$10m
Restricted bidding, at least 5 suppliers	Above J\$5m, up to J\$10m	Above J\$3m, up to J\$8m	Above J\$10m, up to J\$20m
National competitive bidding	Above J\$10m, up to J\$60m	Above J\$8m, up to J\$60m	Above J\$20m, up to J\$150m
International competitive bidding	Above J\$60m	Above J\$60m	Above J\$150m

Source: Public Procurement Regulations, 2018; Public Procurement (Competition Threshold) Order, 2025. The bands for restricted and competitive bidding are those of the 2018 Regulations and should be read with the 2025 Order. Single source and restricted competition are also permitted at any value in the circumstances set out in sections 24 and 25 of the Public Procurement Act. A more competitive method may be used at any value.

Permitted Is Not Required

- 2.7** The thresholds identify the least competitive method that a procuring entity may lawfully use for a contract of a given value. They do not require that method to be used. A procuring entity may always use a more competitive method than the threshold permits, and the general rule of open competition, read with the objects of the Public Procurement Act, indicates that it should do so wherever competition is practicable and proportionate to the value of the requirement. Accordingly, an award by single source procurement within the single source threshold is lawful, but it is a choice made by the procuring entity rather than a requirement of the rules.
- 2.8** The DI notes that, in practice, the least competitive method permitted for a given value is often treated as the default. That is not a requirement of the rules. In every instance, a procuring entity remains free to select a more competitive method than the threshold permits, and the general rule of the Public Procurement Act points it toward doing so. The Ministry of Finance and the Public Service (MOFPS), through the Office of Public Procurement Policy (OPPP), is responsible for guidance on the application of the rules.

Approval Tiers

- 2.9** Separately from the competition thresholds, the Public Procurement Act assigns each contract to an approval tier according to its value. The tier determines who must approve the award, not the method by which it may be made. Table 2 sets out the tiers, the approvals required and the methods which may be used within each tier.

Table 2. Approval tiers, approvals required and procurement methods permitted

Tier	Contract value	Approval required	Methods permitted
Tier 1	Up to J\$60m (up to J\$30m before July 7, 2025)	Head of the procuring entity, for awards above the relevant competition threshold. Awards within the threshold do not require the prior approval of the head of entity.	Open competition (the general rule); restricted bidding or request for quotations up to the threshold for restricted competition; single source up to J\$3m for goods and services and J\$5m for works; restricted or single source at any value in the circumstances in sections 24 and 25, including emergencies.
Tier 2	Above J\$60m, up to J\$100m (above J\$30m, up to J\$60m before July 7, 2025)	Head of the procuring entity and endorsement of the PPC.	Open competition (national or international competitive bidding, or request for proposals); restricted or single source only in the circumstances in sections 24 and 25.
Tier 3	Above J\$100m (above J\$60m before July 7, 2025)	Head of the procuring entity, endorsement of the PPC and approval of the Cabinet.	As for Tier 2.

Source: Public Procurement Act, 2015, as amended; Office of Public Procurement Policy, *What has Changed*, 2025.

- 2.10** It follows that, within Tier 1, all methods are available, but single source procurement is permitted on value grounds only for contracts of up to J\$3 million for goods and services and J\$5 million for works. A Tier 1 contract above those values may be awarded by single source only in the circumstances set out in section 25. In Tiers 2 and 3, single source procurement is permitted only in those circumstances, and the award is subject to the endorsement of the PPC and, in Tier 3, the approval of Cabinet.

Emergency Procurement

- 2.11** The Public Procurement (Amendment) Act, 2025 exempted procurement in situations of emergency or extreme urgency from the competitive methods and processes which ordinarily apply. A procuring entity must, however, give public notice of each emergency contract within one month of award, stating the contract, the contractor, the date, the value and the circumstances of the emergency; since November 12, 2025 such notices are published on the Government of Jamaica Electronic Procurement System (GOJEP). Guidance Note 2 of 2025, issued by the MOFPS on November 12, 2025, requires procuring entities to keep full records of emergency procurement, to report monthly to the MOFPS, to report contracts above J\$500,000 to the Commission, and to conduct an internal debriefing exercise within 30 days after the emergency has subsided, in order to assess the effectiveness of the procurement strategies employed and to identify areas for improvement, and to document its findings.

Registration of Contractors

- 2.12** A person may not bid or otherwise participate in public procurement unless registered with the PPC as an approved registered supplier under section 16 of the Public Procurement Act, or approved as an unregistered supplier under section 18. Since the 2025 amendments, registration is not required for single source procurement within the single source threshold, for procurement by open international competition, or where performance of the contract does not require the contractor to be physically present in Jamaica. Proof of tax compliance is required where the estimated value of the contract exceeds the single source threshold.

Reporting to the Commission

- 2.13** Section 51(b) of the Integrity Commission Act empowers the DI, on behalf of the Commission, to require public bodies to furnish information in relation to the contracts they award. Each procuring entity submits a Quarterly Contract Award Report (QCAR) of all contracts exceeding J\$500,000 awarded during the quarter. The QCAR data are the basis of this Report.

3. CONTRACT AWARDS IN 2025

Source and Limitations of the Data

- 3.1** The statistics in this Section are derived from the Commission's consolidated QCAR database as extracted on June 12, 2026. Returns in which a procuring entity reported that no contracts were awarded have been excluded. All references to years and quarters are to calendar years and calendar quarters; the fourth quarter of 2025, being October to December 2025, corresponds to the third quarter of the Government's financial year 2025/26. A copy of the QCAR database is attached to this Report on a USB flash drive, as indicated in paragraph A.1 of the Appendix.
- 3.2** The information submitted is subject to review and analysis by the Commission but, save in respect of contracts selected for monitoring, the Commission does not validate each return. Returns received after June 12, 2026 may occasion minor revisions to the figures but are not expected to affect the proportions or conclusions of this Report. In 2025, 201 procuring entities submitted returns, 187 of which reported awards; in the fourth quarter, returns were received from 193 of the 196 entities required to report.

Headline Statistics

3.3 Table 3 sets out the headline statistics for 2025, compared with 2024, together with the figures for the fourth quarter of 2025, and Table 4 sets out the results for each quarter.

Table 3. Headline QCAR statistics, 2025 compared with 2024

Measure	2024	2025	Change	Q4 2025
Contracts reported	32,468	33,583	up 3.4%	7,836
Value (J\$ billion)	325.10	336.42	up 3.5%	66.44
Average contract (J\$ million)	10.01	10.02	unchanged	8.48
Median contract (J\$ million)	1.22	1.29	up 5.8%	1.40
Emergency contracts (J\$ billion)	9.98	16.26	up 62.9%	10.45
Single source share of contracts	66.7%	69.2%	up 2.5 pts	75.8%
Single source share of value	20.4%	27.3%	up 6.9 pts	41.6%
Open competitive share of contracts	4.7%	4.1%	down 0.6 pts	4.1%

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026. Single source includes emergency contracting.

Table 4. Contracts awarded in each quarter of 2024 and 2025

Quarter	Contracts, 2024	Value, 2024 (J\$ billion)	Contracts, 2025	Value, 2025 (J\$ billion)	Single source share, 2025
Q1	8,176	77.16	8,638	100.80	65.0%
Q2	7,204	57.31	8,520	79.85	68.7%
Q3	7,946	88.58	8,589	89.34	67.7%
Q4	9,142	102.05	7,836	66.44	75.8%
Year	32,468	325.10	33,583	336.42	69.2%

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026. Quarterly values may not sum to the annual total owing to rounding.

3.4 The fourth quarter departs from the pattern of the year. The number of awards in October 2025, before the hurricane, was already 21 percent lower than in October 2024, whereas the fall in value was concentrated in November and December, when the value of routine awards, excluding emergency and hurricane-related contracts, was approximately half that of the corresponding months of 2024. The hurricane therefore appears to have contributed materially to the fall in value in the fourth quarter, but the extent of its effect has not been quantified, and other factors may also have contributed.

Awards by Contract Type




Figure 1. Contracts awarded by type, 2025

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026. Services include consultancy services.

- 3.5** Goods accounted for 13,452 contracts (40.1 percent) and services for 13,472 (40.1 percent). Goods accounted for 60.2 percent of value (J\$202.7 billion), owing principally to purchases of crude oil and petroleum products by Petrojam Limited; services for 24.6 percent (J\$82.9 billion); and works for 6,659 contracts (19.8 percent) valued at J\$50.8 billion (15.1 percent). Percentages may not sum to 100 owing to rounding.

Awards by Procurement Method

- 3.6** For the purposes of this Report, procurement methods are classified as competitive (international and national competitive bidding), lesser competitive (restricted bidding and Government-to-Government arrangements) and non-competitive (single source procurement, including emergency contracting). Table 5 and Figure 2 set out the awards by method.

Table 5. Contracts awarded by procurement method, 2024 and 2025

Procurement method	Number of contracts, 2024 (share)	Value, 2024, J\$ billion (share)	Number of contracts, 2025 (share)	Value, 2025, J\$ billion (share)
International competitive bidding	103 (0.3%)	52.85 (16.3%)	64 (0.2%)	13.83 (4.1%)
National competitive bidding	1,427 (4.4%)	32.26 (9.9%)	1,309 (3.9%)	50.26 (14.9%)
Government-to-Government	221 (0.7%)	1.11 (0.3%)	213 (0.6%)	0.88 (0.3%)
Restricted bidding	9,067 (27.9%)	172.43 (53.0%)	8,763 (26.1%)	179.65 (53.4%)
Single source	21,080 (64.9%)	56.46 (17.4%)	22,646 (67.4%)	75.54 (22.5%)
Emergency contracting	570 (1.8%)	9.98 (3.1%)	588 (1.8%)	16.26 (4.8%)
Total	32,468 (100%)	325.10 (100%)	33,583 (100%)	336.42 (100%)

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026




Figure 2. Number and value of contracts by procurement method, 2025

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026

- 3.7** Single source procurement was by far the most frequently used method. Restricted bidding accounted for the largest share of value, but J\$147.5 billion of the J\$179.7 billion awarded by that method relates to cargoes of crude oil and petroleum products purchased by Petrojam Limited. When the awards of Petrojam Limited are excluded, single source procurement, including emergency contracting, accounted for 69.5 percent of the number and 49.4 percent of the value of contracts awarded by all other procuring entities, and emergency contracting alone for 8.7 percent of their value.

Concentration of Expenditure




Figure 3. Ten procuring entities with the highest value of awards, 2025 (J\$ billion)

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026

- 3.8** Expenditure was concentrated in a small number of procuring entities. Ten entities accounted for 69.1 percent of the value awarded, and Petrojam Limited alone for J\$158.7 billion, or 47.2 percent, of which J\$147.5 billion was for cargoes of crude oil and petroleum products purchased by restricted bidding (paragraph 3.7). By number, the most active entities were the National Water Commission (3,350 contracts), the National Works Agency (1,791) and the Ministry of Health and Wellness (1,718).




Figure 4. Contracts by size band, share of number and share of value, 2025

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026

- 3.9** The majority of awards are of modest value. Contracts each valued at J\$5 million or less made up 86.5 percent of all contracts but only 12.1 percent of value, whereas 97 contracts each exceeding J\$500 million accounted for J\$192.7 billion, or 57.3 percent of value. This distribution supports a risk-based approach, under which the Commission's monitoring resources are concentrated on the relatively few high-value awards, while data analysis is used to identify patterns of concern among the many awards of lesser value.

Emergency Contracting and Hurricane Melissa

- 3.10** Emergency contracts in 2025 amounted to J\$16.3 billion across 588 contracts, 63 percent more in value than in 2024. Of this amount, J\$10.5 billion, across 331 contracts, was awarded in the fourth quarter, more than double the highest quarterly value previously recorded; J\$9.7 billion of it, across 278 contracts, was awarded on or after October 28, 2025, when Hurricane Melissa struck. The first quarter also recorded J\$3.5 billion, principally an award of J\$2.3 billion by the Port Authority of Jamaica for damage repairs to Berth 2 of the Ocho Rios Cruise Ship Terminal.




Figure 5. Value of contracts awarded by emergency contracting, by quarter, 2020 to 2025 (J\$ billion)

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026

- 3.11** Works accounted for J\$11.6 billion of emergency contracting in 2025, or 22.9 percent of the value of all works contracts, rising to 48.7 percent in the fourth

quarter. Sixteen emergency awards each exceeded J\$100 million, while 283 were each valued at J\$5 million or less. The use of emergency contracting by individual procuring entities in response to Hurricane Melissa will be addressed in the Commission's report on its special monitoring programme.

- 3.12** Procuring entities identified in their QCARs 476 contracts, valued at J\$5.0 billion, awarded in the fourth quarter as related to recovery from Hurricane Melissa, of which 182, valued at J\$3.9 billion, were awarded by emergency contracting, 262 by single source and 32 by restricted bidding. These awards warrant full documentation and independent review by the relevant authorities, and will be examined further in the Commission's report on its special monitoring programme, which is ongoing.




Figure 6. Contracts identified by procuring entities as related to Hurricane Melissa recovery, by method, fourth quarter 2025

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026

- 3.13** In addition, 360 single-source awards in 2025, valued at J\$0.84 billion, of which 337 were made in the fourth quarter, were recorded as ordinary single source although their descriptions refer to a hurricane; a portion of which may be among the 262 single-source awards flagged as recovery related. Emergency expenditure as reported in the QCARs is understated to that extent, and the identification of disaster-related contracts is incomplete.
- 3.14** The DI recognises that emergency procurement was necessary to preserve life and to restore essential services. However, the period following the hurricane was one of heightened procurement risk, by reason of the scale of emergency contracting, the size of certain individual awards, the use of emergency methods for contracts other than those identified as related to recovery, and the exemption of emergency procurement from the ordinary rules. That period therefore warrants review after the event by the appropriate authorities, as recommended in Section 6.

Single Source Procurement

- 3.15** Emergency contracting is itself a form of single source procurement. Table 6 sets out the composition of single source procurement in 2025, distinguishing routine awards, awards described as hurricane related and emergency contracts.

Table 6. Composition of single source procurement, 2025

Component	Contracts	Share of all contracts	Value (J\$ billion)	Share of all value
Single source, routine	22,286	66.4%	74.70	22.2%
Single source, described as hurricane related	360	1.1%	0.84	0.2%
Subtotal, recorded as single source	22,646	67.4%	75.54	22.5%
Emergency contracting	588	1.8%	16.26	4.8%
Total single source procurement	23,234	69.2%	91.80	27.3%

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026. A single-source award is treated as hurricane related where its description refers to Hurricane Melissa or to a hurricane.

- 3.16** Single source procurement engaged 8,347 contractors in 2025. Its share of contracts ranged from 65.0 to 68.7 percent in the first three quarters and rose to 75.8 percent in the fourth, and its share of value, which ranged from 19.3 to 30.2 percent in the first three quarters, rose to 41.6 percent in the fourth.
- 3.17** Single source procurement is lawful where the requirement is available from only one supplier. The DI therefore examined whether the high level of single source procurement is explained by requirements of that kind. Legal services, software licences and subscriptions, and specialised professional services such as forensic, audit and advisory work account for only 7.6 percent of single-source awards, and training for a further 2.3 percent. About 88 percent are routine purchases of goods, services and works, of which 88.5 percent were each valued at J\$3 million or less; the remainder are emergency contracts. The prevalence of single source procurement is therefore not explained by the nature of the requirements, but by the routine use of the method for purchases of lower value.
- 3.18** Of the 22,646 contracts recorded as single source in 2025, 3,052, valued at J\$51.6 billion, were above the single source threshold in force on the date of award, being J\$1.5 million for goods and services and J\$2 million for works until May 15, 2025, and J\$3 million and J\$5 million respectively thereafter. Above the threshold, the Public Procurement Act permits single source procurement only in the circumstances set out in section 25. The QCAR does not record which of those circumstances was relied upon, so that these awards cannot be assessed from the returns alone. Having regard to the finding that fewer than 8 percent of single-source awards relate to requirements for which there is often only one supplier, these awards warrant examination by the appropriate authorities.
- 3.19** Single-source awards are predominantly of low value: 87.5 percent of the 22,646 contracts recorded as single source were each valued at J\$3 million or less. However, 122 single-source awards each exceeded J\$40 million, with a combined value of J\$26.2 billion. These include awards of J\$4.16 billion by the Ministry of Health and Wellness for accommodation, J\$1.95 billion by the MOFPS for the Government Pensioners Administrative Services Only (GPASO) health scheme and

J\$1.87 billion by Tax Administration Jamaica for the upgrade of the RAIS system. Single-source awards of this magnitude, even where supported by considerations of continuity or proprietary technology, warrant full documentation of the justification for the use of the method.

Single Source Procurement by Approval Tier

3.20 Table 7 and Figure 7 set out the use of single source procurement in each approval tier in 2024, in 2025 and in the fourth quarter of 2025, having regard to the share of value awarded in each tier. Each award is assigned to the tier in force on its date of award.

Table 7. Single source procurement by approval tier, 2024, 2025 and fourth quarter of 2025

Tier	Period	Number of contracts	Value (J\$ billion)	Share of total value	Single source, share of number of contracts	Single source, share of value in tier	Share of all single-source value
Tier 1	Year 2024	31,876	86.03	26.5%	67.3%	55.7%	72.1%
Tier 1	Year 2025	33,079	98.10	29.2%	69.7%	55.6%	59.5%
Tier 1	Q4 2025	7,749	25.51	38.4%	76.1%	60.1%	55.4%
Tier 2	Year 2024	277	11.90	3.7%	41.2%	39.8%	7.1%
Tier 2	Year 2025	211	10.90	3.2%	40.3%	41.4%	4.9%
Tier 2	Q4 2025	37	2.82	4.3%	67.6%	66.1%	6.7%
Tier 3	Year 2024	315	227.17	69.9%	27.3%	6.1%	20.8%
Tier 3	Year 2025	293	227.41	67.6%	32.1%	14.4%	35.6%
Tier 3	Q4 2025	50	38.10	57.4%	38.0%	27.5%	37.8%
All tiers	Year 2024	32,468	325.10	100%	66.7%	20.4%	100%
All tiers	Year 2025	33,583	336.42	100%	69.2%	27.3%	100%
All tiers	Q4 2025	7,836	66.44	100%	75.8%	41.6%	100%

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026. Each award is assigned to the tier in force on its date of award.




Figure 7. Share of value by approval tier, and single source share of value within each tier, 2024, 2025 and fourth quarter of 2025

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026

- 3.21 Tier 1.** Tier 1 accounts for 98 percent or more of all contracts but for between 26.5 and 38.4 percent of value. Single source procurement is the prevailing method in this tier, accounting for 69.7 percent of Tier 1 contracts and 55.6 percent of Tier 1 value in 2025, while open competitive bidding accounted for only about 15 percent of that value. Tier 1 awards represented 59.5 percent of all single-source value in 2025. The greater part of the expenditure which is approved within procuring entities alone is therefore not tested against competition, and the doubling of the Tier 1 limit has widened the range of contracts to which this applies: in the fourth quarter of 2025, Tier 1 accounted for 38.4 percent of value, compared with 22.6 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024, reflecting both the higher limit and the lower total value of the quarter.
- 3.22 Tier 2.** Tier 2 represents between 3.2 and 4.3 percent of value. About half of Tier 2 value is awarded by open competitive bidding, but single source procurement accounted for about 40 percent of Tier 2 contracts and value in 2024 and 2025, rising to two-thirds in the fourth quarter of 2025. Much of this is emergency contracting: 36 of the 85 single-source awards in Tier 2 in 2025, and 21 of the 25 in the fourth quarter.
- 3.23 Tier 3.** Tier 3 accounts for about two-thirds of the value awarded, owing largely to the purchases of Petrojam Limited by restricted bidding. The share of Tier 3 value awarded by single source more than doubled, from 6.1 percent in 2024 to 14.4 percent in 2025, or from J\$13.8 billion to J\$32.7 billion, and reached 27.5 percent in the fourth quarter. The average Tier 3 single-source award rose from J\$161 million to J\$348 million. Emergency contracting accounted for J\$9.3 billion of this value in 2025; the remaining J\$23.4 billion was awarded by single source in non-emergency circumstances.
- 3.24** By number, therefore, single source procurement is concentrated in Tier 1, where it is permitted for purchases of lower value and where approval rests with the procuring entity. By value, its growth between 2024 and 2025 occurred principally in Tier 3, where single-source value rose by J\$18.9 billion, against J\$6.7 billion in Tier 1. Single-source awards above the Tier 1 limit, although fewer than 1 percent of all single-source awards, accounted for 40.5 percent of single-source value in 2025, against 27.9 percent in 2024. The returns record a date of PPC endorsement or Cabinet approval for 51 of the 75 non-emergency single-source awards each exceeding J\$60 million in 2025; the missing dates may reflect incomplete returns rather than the absence of approval, and the DI will verify them.
- 3.25** Following the doubling of the tier limits on July 7, 2025, 197 contracts valued between J\$30 million and J\$60 million, with a combined value of J\$8.4 billion, were awarded in the second half of 2025 without the endorsement of the PPC which would previously have been required, of which 40 were non-emergency single-

source awards. A further 62 contracts valued between J\$60 million and J\$100 million (J\$4.7 billion) no longer required the approval of Cabinet.

Bidder Participation

3.26 Where suppliers are invited to bid, participation is often limited. Only one bid was received in 31.6 percent of restricted bidding awards in 2025, rising to 36.2 percent in the fourth quarter, and in 12.7 percent of national competitive bidding awards. Single-bid outcomes limit the capacity of procuring entities to demonstrate value for money.

Contractors and Suppliers

3.27 Contracts were awarded in 2025 to 9,937 distinct contractors and suppliers, after the standardisation of 14,647 name variants recorded by procuring entities. The average was 3.4 awards per contractor. Six in ten contractors (6,041) received a single award, while 263 received 20 or more awards each.




Figure 8. Cumulative share of value awarded, by share of contractors ranked by value, 2025


Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026

3.28 The value of awards is highly concentrated. The largest 1 percent of contractors (99) received 70.4 percent of the value awarded, and the largest 10 percent (994) received 90.6 percent, so that the remaining 90 percent of contractors shared only 9.4 percent. Nine of the ten largest recipients, set out in Table 8, were suppliers of crude oil and petroleum products to Petrojam Limited, which together received J\$133.5 billion, or 39.7 percent of all value awarded.

Table 8. Ten largest recipients of contract awards by value, 2025

No.	Contractor or supplier	Awards	Value (J\$ million)	Share of value	Predominant method
1	Shell Western Supply and Trading	3	36,308.3	10.8%	Restricted bidding
2	Shell Trading (US) Company	24	30,141.9	9.0%	Restricted bidding
3	Trafigura Beheer BV	4	14,611.0	4.3%	Restricted bidding
4	Glencore GA	9	12,856.3	3.8%	Restricted bidding
5	Atlantic Trading and Marketing	1	11,812.3	3.5%	Restricted bidding
6	Phillips 66 Company	6	9,705.2	2.9%	Restricted bidding
7	SOCAR Trading (North America) LLC	2	6,900.1	2.1%	Restricted bidding
8	Vitol Inc.	5	6,362.7	1.9%	Restricted bidding
9	Fujitsu Caribbean (Jamaica) Limited	26	5,696.6	1.7%	International competitive bidding
10	Carib LPG Trading Limited	31	4,768.9	1.4%	Restricted bidding

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026. Names as recorded by procuring entities, standardised.

**Figure 9.** Contractors and value by competition exposure, 2025

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026. "Mixed" denotes contractors who received both non-competitive and other awards.

- 3.29** Seven in ten contractors (7,008, or 70.5 percent) received their awards exclusively by single source or emergency contracting, amounting to 14,153 contracts valued at J\$55.5 billion. A further 1,339 contractors received both non-competitive and other awards, while 1,590 contractors, accounting for half of the value, received awards only through competitive or lesser competitive methods. For the great majority of suppliers to the public sector, therefore, the award of Government business in 2025 was not tested against competing offers.
- 3.30** The data also disclose patterns of repeated single-source awards. In 234 instances a procuring entity made ten or more single-source awards to the same contractor during the year, amounting to 5,021 contracts valued at J\$13.0 billion; 37 of these instances relate to the National Works Agency. Table 9 sets out the pairs with the most awards.

Table 9. Procuring entity and contractor pairs with the most single-source awards, 2025

Procuring entity	Contractor or supplier	Single-source awards	Value (J\$ million)
HEART/NSTA Trust	Kamkaizen Company Group Limited	209	369.1
National Water Commission	Incotek Company Limited	99	285.8
National Works Agency	Lesclar Synergy Construction Company Limited	93	223.0
National Water Commission	MacGreg Equipment Company Limited	88	56.6
Western Regional Health Authority	National Health Fund	87	248.3
National Works Agency	Maxwell Construction Company Limited	87	199.2
Manchester Municipal Corporation	Xpress Wata Haulage	76	129.7
National Works Agency	Rick Williams Trucking Equipment and Construction Limited	69	147.0
Kingston and St Andrew Municipal Corporation	Kenvett Construction Limited	68	83.6
National Works Agency	WRW Innovations Limited	68	131.2

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026

- 3.31** There were 1,618 instances in which a procuring entity made two or more single-source awards to the same contractor on the same day, amounting to 4,317 contracts valued at J\$11.5 billion; in the most pronounced cases, 19 awards were made to one contractor on a single day. The instances were spread evenly across the four quarters, and are not therefore explained by the hurricane. In 416 of them, comprising 1,619 contracts valued at J\$2.9 billion, the awards made on the same day together exceeded the single source limit, applying the higher 2025 limits, although each was within it.
- 3.32** Such patterns may reflect legitimate arrangements, including the issue of separate purchase orders for discrete work packages and the urgent engagement of contractors after an emergency. They may equally indicate the division of a single requirement into smaller contracts so as to remain within the limits for single source procurement, which section 25G of the Public Procurement Act prohibits. These instances warrant examination by the appropriate authorities.

Contractor Registration and the Participation of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises

- 3.33** The Public Procurement Act seeks two aims which must be balanced. On the one hand, registration with the PPC provides assurance that a contractor exists, is tax compliant and, in the case of works, has the capacity for the work. On the other hand, one of the objects of the Act is to encourage national growth by enabling the participation of small and medium sized enterprises, for which the cost of registration may be disproportionate to the value of the work. The 2025 amendments struck the balance by exempting from registration single source

procurement within the single source threshold, while maintaining the requirement for contracts above it. The DI has therefore examined the rate at which procuring entities engage PPC-registered contractors, compared with contractors who do not require registration, within and above that threshold.

Table 10. Contracts within and above the single source threshold, and recorded registration of contractors, 2024 and 2025

Measure	2024	2025
Contracts within the single source threshold	23,330 (71.9%)	27,666 (82.4%)
Value of those contracts (J\$ billion)	23.67 (7.3%)	35.14 (10.4%)
Contracts above the single source threshold	9,138 (28.1%)	5,917 (17.6%)
Value of those contracts (J\$ billion)	301.43 (92.7%)	301.28 (89.6%)
Contracts above the threshold with a PPC registration number	17.2%	25.0%
Works contracts above the threshold with a PPC registration number	25.6%	42.5%
Works contracts above J\$10 million with a PPC registration number	28.6%	45.5%
Contractors receiving only awards within the threshold, with no PPC registration number	5,880 (61.6% of contractors)	7,015 (70.6% of contractors)
Share of contracts and of value received by those contractors	37.2% and 3.6%	47.2% and 5.5%
Contractors with a PPC registration number on at least one award	680 (7.1%)	817 (8.2%)
Share of value received by those contractors	29.3%	27.2%

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026. The single source threshold is that applicable in each year: J\$1.5 million for goods and services and J\$2 million for works in 2024; J\$3 million and J\$5 million in 2025. Foreign contractors are excluded from the count of contractors receiving only awards within the threshold.

- 3.34** The data disclose a system which, at low value, is open to a large number of small suppliers. In 2025, 82.4 percent of contracts fell within the single source threshold, but they accounted for only 10.4 percent of the value awarded. Some 7,015 contractors, seven in ten of all contractors, received only such awards and bore no PPC registration number; the median value of all the awards received by each of them during the year was J\$1.4 million. Although the QCARs do not identify the size of a contractor, these are, in the DI's assessment, predominantly micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), many of them suppliers to the National Water Commission, the Ministry of Health and Wellness, the HEART/NSTA Trust, the municipal corporations and the regional health authorities. They received 47.2 percent of all contracts but 5.5 percent of the value. The raising of the threshold in 2025 enlarged this space, from 71.9 to 82.4 percent of contracts. To this extent the system is giving effect to the object of the Act of enabling the participation of smaller enterprises, and the fiscal exposure is limited.
- 3.35** Above the threshold, where the Public Procurement Act requires the supplier to be registered or approved and where 89.6 percent of the value is awarded, the

position is different. A PPC registration number is recorded for only 25.0 percent of these contracts (1,479 of 5,917), although the rate has risen from 17.2 percent in 2024 (1,569 of 9,138), and from 25.6 to 42.5 percent for works. The number of such contracts with a registration number fell slightly, because the higher 2025 threshold reduced the number of contracts above it. Only 817 contractors, 8.2 percent of the total, bore a PPC registration number on any award, but they received 27.2 percent of the value awarded. A further 41.7 percent of contracts above the threshold bear another identifier, which may in some cases be a registration number recorded in a different form, so that registration may be understated; but it cannot be verified from the returns.

Table 11. Contracts by recorded PPC registration status of the contractor, 2025

Registration status	Contracts	Share of contracts	Value (J\$ billion)	Median value (J\$ million)	Non-competitive share
Below threshold for PPC registration	12,444	37.1%	14.63	0.95	75%
Exempt	7,502	22.3%	179.21	1.13	72%
Other identifier stated	7,287	21.7%	72.81	2.00	61%
PPC registered	2,714	8.1%	44.54	4.20	46%
Foreign contractor	1,293	3.9%	10.62	1.88	86%
Consultant (firm or individual)	1,134	3.4%	10.48	1.84	66%
No PPC registration	585	1.7%	1.97	1.19	81%
Approved unregistered supplier	362	1.1%	0.74	1.28	90%
Government-to-Government	260	0.8%	1.41	1.44	64%

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026. "Other identifier stated" denotes a number or reference not in the PPC registration format. Two contracts with no status recorded are omitted.

- 3.36** The recording of registration status is inconsistent between procuring entities. "Exempt" is recorded for 92 percent of the awards of the HEART/NSTA Trust and for more than half of those of the National Water Commission and the University Hospital of the West Indies, while the National Works Agency records a non-PPC identifier for 80 percent of its awards and the South East and Western Regional Health Authorities record 79 and 75 percent of their awards respectively as below the threshold. Fifty-six contracts above the threshold were recorded as "below threshold", which is inconsistent with their value. Variations of this kind limit the reliability of the returns as a control.




Figure 10. Share of contracts by recorded PPC registration status, by quarter, 2021 to 2025

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026

- 3.37** The proportion of contracts awarded to contractors identified by a PPC registration number has risen steadily, from a negligible level in 2021 to 9.0 percent in the third quarter of 2025, before declining to 7.2 percent in the fourth quarter. Awards to contractors recorded as having no PPC registration rose to 2.5 percent of contracts in the fourth quarter, from between 1.3 and 1.7 percent in the preceding quarters, an increase associated with the emergency: 56 such contracts in 2025, valued at J\$1.0 billion, were awarded by emergency contracting, 45 of them in the fourth quarter.




Figure 11. Contracts by recorded PPC registration status and level of competition, 2025

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026

- 3.38** Registration status is also associated with the method of procurement. Of the contracts awarded to contractors identified by a PPC registration number, 13.4 percent were awarded by open competitive bidding; of those awarded to contractors recorded as having no PPC registration, 1.9 percent were awarded competitively and 81.2 percent by non-competitive methods. Where neither registration nor competition is present, the assurance provided to the public is at its lowest.
- 3.39** In the DI's assessment, the balance struck by the Act is broadly appropriate at low value. Registration attaches to the supplier or contractor, not to the individual purchase, and is granted for a period of three years at present. Nevertheless, a

requirement that every small supplier be registered before it could sell to Government within the single source threshold would impose costs out of proportion to the value of the work, would reduce local participation, particularly in rural communities, and would add little assurance in respect of 10 percent of the value awarded. The balance is less certain above the threshold, where the value is concentrated and where the Act requires registration, but where a registration number is recorded for only a quarter of contracts, so that compliance cannot be confirmed from the returns. The two aims are not in conflict: registration that is simple, inexpensive and accessible to MSMEs would allow them to compete for larger contracts while preserving the assurance which registration provides. The DI also notes that the exemption at low value must not become a route by which larger requirements are divided so as to avoid both competition and registration (paragraph 3.31). The measures recommended by the DI are set out in Section 6.

4. KEY TRENDS, 2006 TO 2025

Scope of the Analysis

- 4.1** Having regard to the findings for 2025, the DI examined the contract award data held by the Commission over the period 2006 to 2025, in order to establish whether those findings reflected sustained trends. The consolidated database contains 334,680 contract records submitted since 2006, excluding nil returns, with a combined reported value of J\$2.46 trillion.
- 4.2** The trends should be read with the following considerations in mind:
- (a) values are stated in nominal terms. Where values are compared between years, the effect of inflation is shown in a text box (Boxes 1 to 4), in which values are restated in 2025 prices using the annual average rate of consumer price inflation published by the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN), compounded over the years concerned. Values have not been adjusted for movements in the exchange rate;
 - (b) the legal and administrative framework has evolved over the period. Contract awards were originally reported to the Office of the Contractor General, a function which passed to the Commission upon its establishment. The threshold above which contracts must be reported, the thresholds which determine the procurement method and the approval tiers were all revised during the period, including upon the coming into force of the Public Procurement Act and the Public Procurement Regulations, 2018, and most recently in 2025. The classification of procurement methods in the returns was also revised in 2011 and 2012; and

- (c) the Public Procurement (Amendment) Act, 2025 exempted emergency procurement from the methods and processes which ordinarily apply. Some movements may therefore reflect changes in the rules as well as in practice, and comparisons between earlier and more recent years should be made with care.

Growth in Volume and Value




Figure 12. Contracts reported to the Commission each year, number and value, 2006 to 2025

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026. Values are nominal.

- 4.3** The number of contracts reported annually has increased sixfold since 2006, notwithstanding the upward revision of the reporting threshold, and has risen in each year since 2021, reaching 33,583 in 2025. The value of awards increased markedly from 2012, attained a peak of J\$364.4 billion in 2022, and has since stabilised at about J\$320 billion to J\$340 billion per annum. In real terms, however, the value of awards has declined in each year since 2022, as shown in Box 1.

Box 1: Annual value of awards adjusted for inflation

The values in paragraph 4.3 are nominal and include the effect of rising prices. To show the change in real terms, each year's value has been restated in 2025 prices by multiplying it by the compounded increase in consumer prices between that year and 2025, that is, by the product of one plus the annual average rate of inflation for each subsequent year up to 2025. Changes are shown on the previous calendar year.

On this basis, the value of awards increased about six and a half times between 2012 and 2025, rather than thirteen times as the nominal values suggest. The peak of J\$364.4 billion in 2022 equates to J\$425.4 billion in 2025 prices, so that the value of awards in 2025 was about 21 percent lower in real terms than in 2022. The apparent stability since 2023 is, in real terms, a modest decline: the nominal increases of 1.7 percent in 2024 and 3.5 percent in 2025 were below inflation of 5.4 percent and 4.0 percent, so that real value fell by 3.5 percent and 0.5 percent respectively. The consolidated total of J\$2.46 trillion for 2006 to 2025 equates to about J\$3.21 trillion in 2025 prices.

Year	Inflation	Nominal value (J\$bn)	In 2025 prices (J\$bn)	Nominal change on previous calendar year	Real change on previous calendar year
2006	8.6%	5.4	20.9	n/a	n/a
2007	9.2%	9.6	33.8	up 77.0%	up 62.0%
2008	22.0%	11.8	33.9	up 22.4%	up 0.3%
2009	9.6%	16.9	44.4	up 43.4%	up 30.8%
2010	12.6%	15.5	36.1	down 8.4%	down 18.7%
2011	7.6%	16.3	35.3	up 5.3%	down 2.1%
2012	6.9%	25.8	52.3	up 58.1%	up 48.0%
2013	9.3%	45.5	84.3	up 76.4%	up 61.3%
2014	8.3%	59.0	101.0	up 29.7%	up 19.8%
2015	3.7%	101.8	168.2	up 72.7%	up 66.5%
2016	2.4%	82.4	133.0	down 19.0%	down 20.9%
2017	4.4%	119.0	184.1	up 44.4%	up 38.4%
2018	3.7%	93.1	138.8	down 21.8%	down 24.6%
2019	3.9%	133.7	191.8	up 43.6%	up 38.2%
2020	5.2%	171.6	234.0	up 28.3%	up 22.0%
2021	5.9%	204.1	262.9	up 19.0%	up 12.4%
2022	10.4%	364.4	425.4	up 78.5%	up 61.8%
2023	6.5%	319.7	350.5	down 12.3%	down 17.6%
2024	5.4%	325.1	338.1	up 1.7%	down 3.5%
2025	4.0%	336.4	336.4	up 3.5%	down 0.5%

Sources: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026; Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN), Consumer Price Index, annual average rates of inflation. Values are not adjusted for movements in the exchange rate.




Figure 13. Quarterly value of contracts reported, 2020 to 2025

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026

4.4 Fourth quarter values rose from J\$43.1 billion in 2020 to J\$102.0 billion in 2024, with a dip in 2023, before declining to J\$66.4 billion in 2025, a departure from the established pattern in which the fourth quarter ranks among the strongest of the year. The decline in 2025 is slightly larger in real terms (Box 2).

Box 2: Fourth quarter values adjusted for inflation

The fourth quarter values in paragraph 4.4 have been restated in 2025 prices in the same way as in Box 1, using the annual average rate of inflation for each year. This is an approximation, since prices change within the year, but it is sufficient for comparisons between years.

In real terms, fourth quarter values rose by about 81 percent between 2020 and 2024, rather than by 137 percent as the nominal values suggest, and the decline in 2025 was 37.4 percent rather than 34.9 percent. In 2025 prices, the value of awards in the fourth quarter of 2025 was lower than in any fourth quarter since 2020. The finding in paragraph 4.4 is therefore confirmed, and not explained, by inflation.

Fourth quarter	Nominal value (J\$bn)	In 2025 prices (J\$bn)	Nominal change on previous fourth quarter	Real change on previous fourth quarter
2020	43.1	58.7	up 14.8%	up 9.1%
2021	62.1	80.0	up 44.3%	up 36.3%
2022	83.0	96.9	up 33.6%	up 21.0%
2023	75.5	82.8	down 9.0%	down 14.5%
2024	102.0	106.1	up 35.1%	up 28.2%
2025	66.4	66.4	down 34.9%	down 37.4%

Sources: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026; Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN), Consumer Price Index, annual average rates of inflation. Values are not adjusted for movements in the exchange rate.

The Decline of Competitive Procurement




Figure 14. Share of contracts awarded by level of competition, 2012 to 2025

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026

4.5 The most significant long-term trend is the sustained shift toward non-competitive procurement. In 2012, 36 percent of contracts were awarded by single source or emergency methods. By 2017 this proportion had risen to 67 percent, and in 2025 it reached 69 percent, the highest level in the series. Over the same period, the proportion of contracts awarded by open competitive bidding declined from 8.7 percent to 4.1 percent. Part of the increase to 2017 may reflect revisions to the thresholds, but the level has been sustained in every year since.

- 4.6** A considerable part of this shift reflects the increased use of single source procurement for purchases of low value, which the rules permit within thresholds that have been revised from time to time. The outcome is nonetheless inconsistent with the Public Procurement Act, which makes open competition the general rule and the promotion of competition one of its objects, and it shows how limited the role of competition has become under the rules as they stand and as they are applied. In addition, as Section 3 shows, the data disclose patterns which may indicate non-compliance and which warrant examination, including single-source awards above the single source threshold (paragraph 3.18) and same-day awards whose combined value exceeded the single source limit (paragraph 3.31).

Bidder Participation over Time




Figure 15. Share of tendered contracts in which only one bid was received, 2015 to 2025

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026

- 4.7** Where suppliers are invited to bid, participation has diminished. The proportion of restricted bidding awards in which only one bid was received rose from 18.6 percent in 2015 to about 24 percent in 2016 and 2017, ranged between 26 and 30 percent from 2019 to 2023, and reached 32.4 percent in 2024 and 31.6 percent in 2025. For national competitive bidding, the proportion has ranged between about 9 and 16 percent.

Emergency Contracting over Time

- 4.8** Between 2020 and the third quarter of 2025, emergency contracting ordinarily ranged between J\$1.0 billion and J\$4.4 billion per quarter, with increases associated with the COVID-19 response in early 2020 and with Hurricane Beryl in the third quarter of 2024. The fourth quarter of 2025, at J\$10.5 billion, is the highest recorded, and reflects both the scale of the emergency and the relaxation of the procurement rules which followed it. The pattern confirms that the use of emergency methods is closely associated with disaster events, and that the period following a disaster is one of heightened procurement risk requiring correspondingly heightened oversight. Box 3 shows that this remains the case after adjustment for inflation.

Box 3: Emergency contracting adjusted for inflation

Restated in 2025 prices, the ordinary range of emergency contracting between 2020 and the third quarter of 2025 in paragraph 4.8 was about J\$1.1 billion to J\$6.0 billion per quarter, rather than J\$1.0 billion to J\$4.4 billion.

The fourth quarter of 2025 remains the highest quarter recorded in real terms. It was about 1.4 times the previous highest quarter, the fourth quarter of 2017, and about 1.7 times the first quarter of 2020, at the onset of the COVID-19 response. Selected quarters are compared below.

Quarter	Nominal value (J\$bn)	In 2025 prices (J\$bn)	Fourth quarter of 2025 as a multiple, real terms
Fourth quarter of 2017	4.7	7.2	1.4 times
First quarter of 2020 (COVID-19)	4.4	6.0	1.7 times
Third quarter of 2024 (Hurricane Beryl)	4.0	4.2	2.5 times
Fourth quarter of 2025 (Hurricane Melissa)	10.5	10.5	n/a

Sources: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026; Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN), Consumer Price Index, annual average rates of inflation. Values are not adjusted for movements in the exchange rate.

Effect of the 2025 Threshold Changes

4.9 Calendar year 2024 was governed throughout by the thresholds in force before the 2025 changes. Table 12 compares the single source share of contracts in fixed value bands in 2024 and 2025.

Table 12. Single source share of contracts by value band, 2024 and 2025

Value band	Number, 2024	Single source, 2024	Number, 2025	Single source, 2025	Change	Open bidding, 2024	Open bidding, 2025
Up to J\$1.5m	21,626	72.6%	20,932	74.0%	up 1.4 pts	0.9%	0.9%
J\$1.5m to J\$3m	4,670	66.3%	6,171	73.4%	up 7.1 pts	2.8%	2.3%
J\$3m to J\$5m	1,747	52.1%	1,949	59.6%	up 7.5 pts	8.9%	4.7%
J\$5m to J\$30m	3,833	45.7%	3,830	46.9%	up 1.2 pts	20.7%	17.4%
J\$30m to J\$60m	277	41.2%	346	36.4%	down 4.8 pts	50.2%	48.6%
J\$60m to J\$100m	96	50.0%	113	54.9%	up 4.9 pts	34.4%	42.5%
Above J\$100m	219	17.4%	242	25.6%	up 8.2 pts	34.2%	31.0%

Source: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026. Single source includes emergency contracting.

4.10 Among contracts of lower value, the increase in 2025 is concentrated in the value bands affected by the higher single source limits: the share rose by 7.1 percentage points for contracts of J\$1.5 million to J\$3 million and by 7.5 points for J\$3 million to J\$5 million, a band brought within the limit for works, against about 1 point in the other bands below J\$30 million. The rise of 8.2 points among contracts above J\$100 million reflects the high-value single-source awards discussed in paragraph 3.24. For works contracts of J\$2 million to J\$5 million, the share rose from 36.4 percent in the first half of 2025 to 82.8 percent in the second half. In these bands

single source procurement has displaced restricted bidding and, to a lesser extent, open competition: open competitive bidding for contracts of J\$3 million to J\$5 million fell from 8.9 to 4.7 percent. The effect of inflation on these comparisons is shown in Box 4.

Box 4: Value bands adjusted for inflation

Table 12 uses the same value bands, in nominal terms, for 2024 and 2025. As consumer prices rose by 4.0 percent in 2025, a contract valued at J\$1.5 million in 2024 corresponds to about J\$1.56 million in 2025 prices. Restating the 2024 contracts in 2025 prices moves some of them into the next band, chiefly those valued just below the former single source limit of J\$1.5 million.

On this basis, the increase in the single source share is 8.5 points for contracts of J\$3 million to J\$5 million, rather than 7.5 points, and 3.0 points for contracts of J\$1.5 million to J\$3 million, rather than 7.1 points. The finding that the increase is concentrated in the band brought within the single source limit for works is therefore unaffected, while part of the increase in the J\$1.5 million to J\$3 million band reflects the effect of prices on the band boundaries rather than the higher limits. The increase among contracts above J\$100 million is 5.9 points in real terms.

Value band (2025 prices)	Single source, 2024 (nominal)	Single source, 2024 (2025 prices)	Single source, 2025	Change, real terms
Up to J\$1.5m	72.6%	72.1%	74.0%	up 1.9 pts
J\$1.5m to J\$3m	66.3%	70.4%	73.4%	up 3.0 pts
J\$3m to J\$5m	52.1%	51.1%	59.6%	up 8.5 pts
J\$5m to J\$30m	45.7%	45.6%	46.9%	up 1.3 pts
J\$30m to J\$60m	41.2%	45.5%	36.4%	down 9.1 pts
J\$60m to J\$100m	50.0%	45.6%	54.9%	up 9.3 pts
Above J\$100m	17.4%	19.7%	25.6%	up 5.9 pts

Sources: Integrity Commission QCAR data as at June 12, 2026; Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN), Consumer Price Index, annual average rates of inflation. Values are not adjusted for movements in the exchange rate. Single source includes emergency contracting.

4.11 The changes have therefore had a distorting effect on comparisons between years, and part of the increase in single source procurement in 2025 reflects the higher limits now permitted. However, the overall level of single source procurement predates the changes: it was 66.7 percent of contracts in 2024, against 69.2 percent in 2025. The changes add to the level but do not explain it.

5. CONCLUSION

5.1 The DI's examination of the contract award data for 2025, and for the period 2006 to 2025, leads to the following principal conclusions:

- (a) **Competition is the exception.** Although the Public Procurement Act makes open competition the general rule and the promotion of competition, value for money and transparency among its objects, about two-thirds of contracts have been awarded without competition in every year since 2017, reaching 69.2 percent in 2025, while open competitive bidding has fallen to 4.1 percent of contracts.

- (b) **The level reflects choice within the rules.** Single source procurement within the thresholds is permitted, not required. It is not explained by requirements for which there is only one supplier, which account for fewer than 8 percent of single-source awards, but by the routine use of the method for purchases of lower value.
- (c) **The 2025 changes have widened the scope for non-competitive awards.** The higher single source limits have been taken up quickly, particularly for works, and the doubling of the tier limits has removed a large number of contracts from external approval. Neither change has yet been evaluated.
- (d) **Value is concentrated in high-value single-source awards.** By number, single source procurement is concentrated in Tier 1; by value, its growth is concentrated in Tier 3, where the share of value awarded by single source more than doubled. Fewer than 1 percent of single-source awards carry 40.5 percent of single-source value.
- (e) **Emergency procurement requires accountability after the event.** The response to Hurricane Melissa produced the highest level of emergency contracting recorded, under rules which exempt such procurement from the ordinary methods. Emergency expenditure is understated in the returns and the identification of disaster-related contracts is incomplete.
- (f) **Supplier markets are concentrated and participation is limited.** Seven in ten contractors receive Government business without competition, the largest 1 percent of contractors receive 70 percent of value, and a single bid is received in almost a third of restricted bidding awards.
- (g) **Patterns of awards warrant examination.** Single-source awards above the single source threshold, where the method is permitted only in limited circumstances and repeated and same-day single-source awards to the same contractors may indicate non-compliance, including the division of requirements contrary to section 25G of the Public Procurement Act.
- (h) **The balance between registration and MSME participation cannot be fully assessed.** At low value, the exemption from registration is enabling the wide participation of smaller enterprises, as the Act intends, at limited fiscal exposure. Above the single source threshold, where value is concentrated and registration is required, a registration number is recorded for only a quarter of contracts, and its recording is inconsistent, so that compliance with the requirement and the eligibility of contractors, cannot be confirmed from the returns.

5.2 Taken together, these conclusions indicate that the public procurement system, as it operates, falls short of the objects of the Public Procurement Act in respect of competition, value for money, participation and transparency. The DI finds that the correction of these weaknesses lies partly in the practice of procuring entities

and partly in policy and legislation. The DI, therefore, makes the recommendations in Section 6 and submits the matters in Section 7 accordingly.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 6.1** Arising from the conclusions in Section 5, the DI makes the following recommendations. Each identifies the authority which the DI considers responsible for its implementation.

Use of Competition

- 6.2 Permitted methods.** The MOFPS, through the OPPP, should remind procuring entities by guidance that the competition thresholds permit, but do not require, the use of less competitive methods; that open competition remains the general rule; and that an entity is free in every case to use a more competitive method. Where competition was practicable but single source procurement was used within the threshold, the reason should be recorded on the file (paragraph 5.1 (a) and (b)).
- 6.3 Low-value purchases.** Procuring entities should seek competing quotations for purchases within the single source threshold wherever this is practicable, and should aggregate recurring requirements. The OPPP should further promote the use of framework agreements and consolidated purchasing for common goods and services, so that a greater proportion of low-value expenditure is subject to competition.
- 6.4 Evaluation of the 2025 changes.** The MOFPS should evaluate the effect of the 2025 changes to the competition thresholds and the approval tiers, after a full year of operation and report the results to Parliament and/or otherwise publish them, including the use of single source procurement for works and the value of contracts no longer subject to PPC endorsement or Cabinet approval (paragraph 5.1(c)).
- 6.5 Bidder participation.** Procuring entities should examine the reasons for single-bid outcomes, including specifications, bid periods, estimates and the number of suppliers invited and should make greater use of GOJEP to widen participation. The PPC and the OPPP should continue to undertake and intensify their supplier outreach, particularly to small and rural suppliers. The MOFPS and procuring entities should also ensure that payment systems, including the Government Financial Management System (GFMS), pay suppliers promptly, since delays in payment may deter suppliers and contractors, particularly smaller enterprises, from bidding for Government contracts (paragraph 5.1(f)).

High-Value Single Source Procurement

- 6.6 Justification and approval.** For every single-source award above the Tier 1 limit, the procuring entity should document the circumstances under section 25 relied upon and the PPC should, in considering endorsement, require that justification and record it (if not yet being done). The PPC should publish, at least annually, a summary of single-source awards which it has endorsed (paragraph 5.1(d)).
- 6.7 Internal controls in Tier 1.** Heads of procuring entities, supported by their internal auditors and procurement committees, should strengthen the review of single-source awards in Tier 1, particularly those approaching the single source limits and those between J\$30 million and J\$60 million which no longer require PPC endorsement.

Emergency Procurement

- 6.8 Post-emergency review of Hurricane Melissa procurement.** The DI recommends a structured review of the procurement undertaken in response to Hurricane Melissa, with responsibility allocated as follows:
- (a) each procuring entity which undertook emergency procurement should complete the debriefing exercise required by Guidance Note 2 of 2025 and submit its report to the MOFPS;
 - (b) the MOFPS, through the OPPP, should compile those reports and report on compliance with the requirement to publish emergency contract award notices, with their justification, on GOJEP within one month of award;
 - (c) the Auditor General, as the authority responsible for the audit of public expenditure, is the appropriate authority to audit the compliance and value for money of the emergency expenditure, including the largest awards. The DI acknowledges that the Auditor General is already conducting real-time audits of contracts related to Hurricane Melissa; and
 - (d) the Commission has implemented a special monitoring programme for procurement related to the Hurricane Melissa response and recovery, which is ongoing and will be reported on in due course; where the circumstances warrant, the DI will investigate under the Integrity Commission Act.
- 6.9 Identification of disaster-related contracts.** The Commission already requires procuring entities to identify contracts related to Hurricane Melissa in their QCARs. The DI recommends that the identification of disaster-related contracts be made a standing requirement, in GOJEP by the MOFPS and in the QCAR by the Commission, for every future declared emergency, so that all such contracts, whatever the method used, are recorded as such from the outset (paragraph 5.1(e)).

Repeated and Same-Day Awards

6.10 Examination. The DI will examine the instances of repeated and same-day single-source awards identified in this Report, beginning with those whose combined value exceeded the single source limit, in order to determine whether requirements were divided contrary to section 25G. Heads of the procuring entities concerned should account for these instances to their audit committees, and procuring entities generally should record on the file the reason for multiple awards to the same contractor within a short period (paragraph 5.1(g)).

Registration of Contractors: Striking the Balance

6.11 The DI recommends that the balance between the assurance provided by registration and the participation of micro, small and medium enterprises be maintained at low value and strengthened where value is concentrated, by the following measures (paragraph 5.1(h)):

- (a) **Preserve access for smaller suppliers within the threshold.** Registration should continue not to be required for single source procurement within the single source threshold, as the Act provides, so that smaller and rural suppliers may continue to participate. Every such award should, however, record a unique identifier for the supplier, such as the Taxpayer Registration Number and/or GOJEP unique identifier, so that awards to the same supplier can be traced across procuring entities and the division of requirements detected. Responsibility: the OPPP and the Commission, for GOJEP and the QCARs respectively.
- (b) **Make registration accessible to MSMEs.** The DI notes that the PPC is already taking steps to make registration more accessible to micro, small and medium enterprises, and encourages the continuation of that work, so that such enterprises can register and compete for contracts above the threshold rather than remain confined below it. Responsibility: the PPC, with the MOFPS.
- (c) **Apply the requirement where value is concentrated.** For contracts above the single source threshold, procuring entities should verify before award that the supplier is registered or approved as an unregistered supplier, as the Act requires and should record a unique identifier in the correct format. For works contracts above J\$10 million, procuring entities should consider engaging only contractors registered in the category and grade appropriate to the work. Responsibility: procuring entities, with the OPPP.
- (d) **Provide for emergencies.** The PPC should maintain, for each parish, a standing roster of registered contractors, including smaller local firms, available for emergency engagement. Where an unregistered contractor must be engaged in an emergency, the contractor should be required to

obtain approved unregistered supplier status within a fixed period after award, such as 30 days and before final payment. Responsibility: the PPC and the MOFPS.

- (e) **Monitor the balance.** The MOFPS should report annually on the share of contracts and value awarded to registered contractors above the threshold, and on the participation of MSMEs, so that the balance intended by the Act can be assessed. Responsibility: the MOFPS.

Data and Reporting

- 6.12 Quality of returns.** Procuring entities should ensure that QCARs are complete and consistent, including contract descriptions sufficient to identify the requirement, contractor names and identifiers, procurement methods, emergency status and approval dates.

7. MATTERS FOR THE ATTENTION OF PARLIAMENT

- 7.1** Arising from the findings and conclusions set out in this Report, the DI respectfully submits the following matters for the attention of Parliament. In each case the DI sets out the policy position under the Public Procurement Act and the outcome shown by the data, identifies the respect in which that outcome is inconsistent with the objects of the Act, and recommends a course of action for the consideration of Parliament. The DI recognises that the policy choices involved are a matter for Parliament.
- 7.2 Competition as the general rule.** The Public Procurement Act makes open competition the general rule, with restricted and single source procurement as exceptions and counts the promotion of competition and value for money among its objects. In practice, single source procurement has accounted for about two-thirds of contracts in every year since 2017, reaching 69 percent in 2025, while open competitive bidding has declined. Much of this is lawful under the thresholds, and it is acknowledged that single source procurement may require less time and administrative effort than competitive methods. By number of contracts, however, the exception has become the predominant practice, which is inconsistent with the general rule of open competition. The DI recommends that Parliament consider a review of the competition thresholds, and of the use made of them, with a view to restoring competition as the general rule in practice.
- 7.3 The 2025 competition thresholds.** The Competition Threshold Order, 2025 raised the single source thresholds, permitting, but not requiring, single source procurement at higher values. It is acknowledged that the change may have reduced the time and administrative effort required for procurement within the new limits. Following the change, however, single source procurement largely displaced restricted

bidding for works within those limits, so that the role of competition in that range of works has been substantially reduced. The DI recommends that Parliament consider an evaluation of the effect of the Order after a full year of operation, including its effect on prices and on the participation of contractors.

- 7.4 Approval of higher-value contracts.** From July 7, 2025, the tier limits were raised, so that contracts which previously required PPC endorsement or Cabinet approval are now approved at a lower level, and many within procuring entities alone. It is acknowledged that the change may have reduced the time and effort required for approval. It has, however, also reduced the external oversight to which contracts of these values were previously subject and without corresponding controls, the assurance of value for money which that oversight provided. The DI recommends that Parliament consider whether the controls which now apply to these contracts are sufficient and whether the tier limits should be reviewed.
- 7.5 High-value single source procurement.** Above the threshold, section 25 of the Public Procurement Act permits single source procurement only in specified circumstances, subject to PPC endorsement and in Tier 3, the approval of Cabinet. In 2025, a small number of high-value single-source awards accounted for a growing share of single-source value and the returns do not record which of the circumstances in section 25 was relied upon, so that the use of the exceptions cannot be assessed. The DI recommends that Parliament consider requiring that the justification under section 25 be recorded for every single-source award above the threshold.
- 7.6 Emergency procurement.** The 2025 amendments exempt emergency procurement from the ordinary methods, so that urgent needs may be met without delay and rely on public notice and debriefing for accountability after the event. Emergency contracting following Hurricane Melissa reached the highest level recorded. The Commission's special monitoring of procurement related to Hurricane Melissa and the Auditor General's real-time audits of Melissa-related contracts, are ongoing. Public notice and debriefing alone may not be sufficient to secure accountability for emergency expenditure on this scale. The DI recommends that Parliament consider requiring by law that a review of emergency procurement by the appropriate authority, reported to Parliament, follow every declared disaster.
- 7.7 Registration and the participation of MSMEs.** The Public Procurement Act requires suppliers to be registered with the PPC but exempts single source procurement within the threshold, consistent with its object of enabling the participation of small and medium sized enterprises. Most contracts, but a small share of value, fall within the exemption, while above the threshold, where most of the value lies, registration cannot be confirmed from the returns for most contracts. The DI recommends that Parliament consider measures to make registration simpler and

more accessible to micro, small and medium enterprises, so that they may compete for contracts above the threshold while the assurance provided by registration is preserved.

- 7.8 Division of requirements.** Section 25G of the Public Procurement Act prohibits the division of a requirement so as to avoid a more competitive method. The returns show a large number of repeated and same-day single-source awards to the same contractors, some of which together exceeded the single source limit. Such patterns may have legitimate explanations, and the DI will examine them (paragraph 6.10), but they may also indicate division contrary to section 25G. The DI recommends that Parliament consider whether section 25G, as presently framed, is sufficient to achieve its purpose and whether the rules on the aggregation of requirements should be clarified.



Kevon A. Stephenson, JP
Director of Investigation
October 12, 2026

A APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES, METHOD AND ABBREVIATIONS

Data Sources and Method

- A.1 QCAR database.** The consolidated QCAR dataset, 2006 to the fourth quarter of 2025, extracted on June 12, 2026, comprising 334,680 contract records after the exclusion of 2,395 nil returns. The statistics for 2025 are based upon the 33,583 contracts awarded in that year. A copy of the QCAR database is attached to this Report on a USB flash drive.
- A.2 Hurricane Melissa.** The figures for contracts identified as related to Hurricane Melissa are derived from the flags entered by procuring entities in their QCARs for the fourth quarter of 2025.
- A.3 Values.** All values are stated in nominal Jamaican dollars, as reported by procuring entities. Where values are compared between years in Section 4, they are also restated in 2025 prices in Boxes 1 to 4, using the annual average rate of consumer price inflation published by the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN), compounded over the years concerned. No adjustment has been made for movements in the exchange rate.
- A.4 Levels of competition.** Competitive methods comprise international and national competitive bidding; lesser competitive methods comprise restricted bidding and Government-to-Government arrangements; and non-competitive methods comprise single source procurement, including emergency contracting. The trend analysis of competition commences in 2012, from which year the current classifications have been applied consistently.
- A.5 Approval tiers.** Each award is assigned to the tier in force on its date of award: the former limits of J\$30 million and J\$60 million until July 6, 2025, and the limits of J\$60 million and J\$100 million thereafter.
- A.6 Nature of single-source awards.** Legal services, software licences and subscriptions, training and specialised professional services were identified from contract descriptions and contract types. Specialised professional services comprise consultancy contracts and service contracts described as forensic, audit, actuarial, cyber security, advisory, valuation or similar work.
- A.7 Repeated and same-day awards.** Awards were matched by procuring entity, standardised contractor name and award date. For the comparison with the single source limit, the 2025 limits of J\$3 million for goods and services and J\$5 million for works were applied to the whole year, which is conservative for awards made before May 16, 2025.
- A.8 Single-source awards above the threshold.** Each award recorded as single source, excluding emergency contracting, was compared with the single source

threshold in force on its date of award: J\$1.5 million for goods and services and J\$2 million for works until May 15, 2025, and J\$3 million and J\$5 million respectively from May 16, 2025. The QCAR does not record the circumstances under section 25 relied upon for such awards.

- A.9 Single-bid rate.** The proportion of awards under a given method in respect of which the number of tenders received was recorded as one.
- A.10 Contractor names.** Names were standardised as to case, punctuation, "&" and "and", "Limited" and "Ltd", "Company" and "Co", and a leading "The". Related companies and firms trading under materially different names continue to be counted separately.
- A.11 Contractor concentration.** Contractors were ranked by the total value of the awards which each received in 2025, after the standardisation of names. The largest 1 percent and 10 percent of the 9,937 contractors comprise the first 99 and 994 contractors respectively.
- A.12 Registration status.** The status is that recorded by the procuring entity. A record is treated as a PPC registration number where it is in the PPC format; other numbers or references are shown as "Other identifier stated". For the comparison of registration above the single source threshold, the 2025 limits of J\$3 million for goods and services and J\$5 million for works were applied to the whole of 2025, and the former limits to 2024.
- A.13 Limitations.** The Commission does not validate each QCAR. The comparability of the data over time is affected by changes in the procurement rules, the thresholds for the procurement methods, the approval tiers and the reporting threshold, as explained in paragraph 4.2.

Abbreviations

Table 13. Abbreviations used in this Report

Abbreviation	Meaning
DI	Director of Investigation
GFMS	Government Financial Management System
GOJEP	Government of Jamaica Electronic Procurement System
GPASO	Government Pensioners Administrative Services Only
ICB	International competitive bidding
HEART/NSTA Trust	Human Employment and Resource Training/National Service Training Agency Trust
MOFPS	Ministry of Finance and the Public Service
MSMEs	Micro, small and medium enterprises
NCB	National competitive bidding
OPPP	Office of Public Procurement Policy
PPC	Public Procurement Commission
QCAR	Quarterly Contract Award Report
RAIS	Revenue Administration Information System
STATIN	Statistical Institute of Jamaica
TRN	Taxpayer Registration Number